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Abstract 
We explore the effects of management innovations on worker well-being using private sector 
linked employer-employee data for Britain. We find management innovations are associated with 
lower worker well-being and lower job satisfaction, an effect which becomes more pronounced 
when we account for the endogeneity of innovation. This is the case for three different count 
measures of innovation – a global measure of innovation and measures for labour innovations 
and capital innovations. The effects are ameliorated when workers are covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Innovation may take many forms, including process innovations in labour deployment and 
capital investment, and innovations in products and services, but it is commonplace to 
assume that firms must be innovative in order to survive and prosper. There is empirical 
evidence to support this claim. For example, the success of Wal-Mart in the United States is 
attributed, in part, to innovations in its supply chain and distribution networks (Holmes, 
2008). Movement towards flexible specialisation in the Italian textiles industry allowed it to 
produce high value-added goods which sustained it in the face of global competition from 
low-cost producers (Piore and Sabel, 1982). Innovations in lean production, total quality 
management and ‘high-involvement management practices’ have been cited as the reasons 
for the commercial success of Japanese car manufacturers (Wood, 1989), US steel producers 
(Ichniowski, et al. 1997) and in manufacturing more generally (Bloom and Van Reenen, 
2007). On the other hand, a failure or inability to innovate can be to the detriment of firms, 
especially in highly competitive markets. Thus, in a recent survey of CEO’s conducted by the 
Economist Intelligence Unit one-third of those questioned identified ‘failure to innovate' as 
one of the top three risks facing their companies over the next three years (EIU, 2005). 
Although change is known to have adverse effects on well-being relatively little 
attention has been devoted to the effects of managerial innovations on worker well-being. 
Most of the research has concentrated on the effects of innovation on job creation and 
destruction. Recent firm-level evidence indicates process innovations lead to job destruction, 
particularly in the short-term, but that these are often compensated for by employment growth 
arising from product and service innovation (Harrison et al., 2008). This innovation-induced 
job shake-out may be met with some trepidation by incumbent workers, potentially leading to 
stress and anxiety. In addition innovations in work practices arising from the introduction of 
new work methods or processes associated with the deployment of new technologies may 
have positive or negative effects on worker well-being depending on whether they are job 
enriching or a source of labour intensification. 
Few studies are able to assess the links between workplace innovations and employee 
well-being because they lack the necessary information. In this paper we use linked 
employer-employee data for British private sector workplaces to explore the effects of 
managerial innovations on employees’ well-being. We consider innovations in products and 
services, and process innovations in relation to both labour organization and capital 
investment, exploring their effects on fourteen measures of employee subjective well-being 
(SWB).  
Managers are rarely free to innovate at will. Innovation can be met with resistance or 
hostility by employees who are either fearful of change or believe it will be to their detriment. 
Where employees have sufficient bargaining power, they may even be able to block 
management attempts to innovate. Some unions were notorious for enforcing restrictive 
labour practices in Britain during the 1960s and 1970s leading to lower labour productivity in 
unionised workplaces compared with their non-union counterparts (Metcalf, 1989). This, 
coupled with the union wage premium, meant unions had a negative impact on profitability. 
However, these productivity and profitability deficits began to decline in the 1980s and had 
largely disappeared by the 1990s (Blanchflower and Bryson, 2009; Menezes-Filho, 1997). 
One possible reason for this might be differential rates of managerial innovation over that 
period in the union and non-union sectors. Certainly, by the beginning of the 21st Century 
new labour working practices were just as evident in the union sector as they were in the non-
union sector and, in some cases, more widespread (Wood and Bryson, 2009). We therefore 
devote particular attention to the role of trade unions in mediating the effects of innovation on 
worker well-being. 
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We have three main findings. First, managerial innovations are associated with lower 
worker well-being and lower job satisfaction, ceteris paribus. Second, the effect becomes 
more pronounced when we account for the endogeneity of innovation. Third, the effect is 
ameliorated when workers are covered by a collective bargaining agreement. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section Two reviews the 
theoretical and empirical literatures linking innovation to worker well-being and the 
mediating role played by unionization. Section Three introduces our data. Section Four 
outlines the empirical strategy. Section Five reports our results and Section Six concludes. 
 
 
2. Theoretical and Empirical Literature 
 
Theory suggests innovation may have either positive or negative effects on worker well-
being. Worker well-being may be adversely affected where managerial innovations are to 
workers’ detriment (or perceived as such), where they generate uncertainty associated with 
future loss, and where they are introduced in a way that is perceived to be unfair. However, 
not all innovations will be perceived in the same fashion by workers because some are more 
likely to impinge on their working conditions and work arrangements than others. For 
example, changes to working hours or work organization may have a greater direct effect on 
workers than, say, the introduction of a new product or service that requires no major change 
to working arrangements. 
Those innovations to which researchers have devoted the most attention are what are 
sometimes referred to as innovative working practices (IWPs) and are akin to the practices 
that are also sometimes described as ‘new’, ‘high-involvement’, ‘high commitment’ or ‘high 
performance’. There are, broadly speaking, two schools of thought on whether IWPs are to 
the detriment of worker well-being. The first holds that IWPs may offer employees 
opportunities to improve the quality of their working lives, via devolved decision-making 
powers and responsibilities. Since workers often demand greater decision-making power at 
the workplace, more control over how they do their work, and more input into managerial 
decision-making (Freeman and Rogers, 1999) it seems reasonable to assume that IWPs may 
increase job satisfaction and well-being. Writers in this school recognise that not all workers 
benefit, for example because of job cuts and associated insecurity (Black et al., 2004); and 
not all workers prefer greater decision-making. The second school of thought is that IWPs 
may entail labour intensification: more is being demanded of workers in terms of their 
commitment and effort; and, because of market rigidities, workers have little choice but to 
engage with them. IWPs are often associated with high levels of work intensity and worker 
stress, even when they are also associated with higher work commitment (Ramsay et al., 
2000) or higher job control (Gallie, 2005). 
A number of studies have looked at the impact of IWPs on job quality and find mixed 
evidence (Godard, 2004). Some (e.g. Barker, 1993; Godard 2001) support the pessimistic 
school of thought finding that some practices are associated with work overload. Others (e.g. 
Appelbaum et al., 2000) have found no adverse effects of some IWPs on stress levels; while 
Doeringer et al (2002) found that manufacturing start-ups which adopt IWPs offer jobs with 
relatively high pay, good training, job security and opportunities for participation. Of 
particular note is Wood’s (2008) study since he uses the Workplace Employment Relations 
Survey 2004, the data used in this paper. Wood (2008) confirms Karasek’s (1979) theory that 
worker well-being is negatively related to job demands and positively related to job control, 
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and that high job controls reduce the negative association between job demands and well-
being.1  
IWPs are often introduced as part of broader structural and organizational changes 
such as the introduction of new plant or technology, changes in management structure, or the 
introduction or redesign of products and services. Such innovation may also bring with it the 
threat of job loss, resulting in job insecurity which, in turn, is associated with negative worker 
affect (De Witte, 1999). Job insecurity may be engendered by innovations such as product 
innovations, regardless of whether they entail IWPs. For instance, they may entail shifts in 
productive capacity either within or across plants, leading to the closure of particular plants 
or production lines. Even if a worker’s job is not at risk, her wellbeing may suffer from the 
knowledge that her work colleagues may be at risk. 
It is not simply the nature of a managerial innovation that may affect worker well-
being. How it is introduced can also matter. Employees’ perceptions of fairness or equity are 
associated with SWB (Warr, 2007: 135-140). Innovations may result in perceptions of 
distributive (in)justice depending upon the allocations of rights and rewards accruing to 
workers and they may result in perceptions of procedural (in)justice depending upon the 
process that governed the introduction of the innovation. As Warr (2007: 137) notes unjust 
outcomes and procedures are themselves experienced as negative, thus directly affecting 
SWB, as well as influencing perceptions of environmental features that also affect SWB, 
such as perceptions of supervisors or the organization in general. The empirical research 
reviewed by Warr finds links between perceptions of unfairness at the workplace and 
emotional exhaustion, distress, and lower job satisfaction (op. cit.).  
Trade unions may play an important role in mitigating or exacerbating the negative 
effects of managerial innovation on worker well-being for a number of reasons. First, unions 
may play a role in negotiating on behalf of their members over the nature of a workplace 
innovation. Worker well-being may be viewed as a public good, that is, a good affecting the 
well-being of everyone in such a way that one individual’s partaking of the good does not 
preclude others from doing so. Without a union, individuals will lack the incentive to pursue 
public goods since, as Freeman and Medoff (1984:8–9) argue: “Without a collective 
organization, the incentive for the individual to take into account the effects of his or her 
actions on others, or to express his or her preferences, or invest time and money in changing 
conditions, is likely to be too small to spur action”. Unions with a strong bargaining position 
may be able to block innovations which appear particularly detrimental to workers. Where 
management innovations proceed they may be significantly modified by the union such that 
they are more acceptable to employees than might have been the case in the absence of trade 
union representation.  
Via their union representatives employees have the opportunity to refashion 
innovations to their advantage, either in response to union-oriented consultations or through 
the union’s role as negotiator with the employer. Consultation and negotiation with union 
representatives gives employees a ‘say’ in the innovation process which can enhance worker 
well-being, irrespective of the final shape of the innovation, simply because workers feel they 
have had some meaningful involvement in the process. This can lead to heightened 
perceptions of procedural fairness and the sense that employees have some control over how 
their working environment is being reshaped. 
The third way in which unions may ameliorate the negative impact of innovations on 
employee well-being is as a guarantor of job security to employees in the face of potentially 
productivity-enhancing labour reorganisation. Unions often link the acceptance of 
                                                 
1 In a similar vein, Bordia et al’s (2004) case study links organizational change to psychological stress through 
perceived loss of control. Pollard (2001) shows that workplace reorganization caused significant increases in 
distress and in systolic blood pressure and that uncertainty was a key factor. 
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innovations to job security commitments, thus increasing the credibility of managerial 
assurances that innovations do not come at the expense of jobs. These agreements often take 
the form of job security guarantees (JSG’s) which seek to avoid compulsory redundancies if 
at all possible. JSG’s are more prevalent in union than in non-union workplaces and, although 
job cuts are just as likely where JSG’s are present, the probability of compulsory redundancy 
is lower. As a consequence, JSG’s reduce employee perceptions of job insecurity (Bryson et 
al., 2009) and may thus facilitate managerial innovation.2 
Fourth, social psychologists argue that social supports can help people cope with high 
demands under conditions of low control (Payne, 1979), as in the case of workers facing 
managerial innovations. Wood (2008: 157) argues that trade unions can be regarded as a 
source of social support which, under Karasek and Theorell’s (1990: 75) model, helps to limit 
the impact of work strain on worker well-being. However, in his empirical analysis he finds 
union membership is not correlated with well-being or job satisfaction. 
A fifth means by which unions may mediate the link between managerial innovations 
and worker well-being is through their efforts to secure higher wages in return for 
productivity-enhancing innovations. This may be seen as a form of rent-sharing on the part of 
unions, or the negotiation of compensatory wage differentials in return for what might be 
regarded as the disamenities associated with managerial innovation. If unions are particularly 
adept at capturing innovation-generated rents this may act as a disincentive for firms to 
innovate in the first place.3 In fact, innovative practices are at least as prevalent in unionized 
workplaces as they are in non-unionized workplaces in Britain (Wood and Bryson, 2009). 
However, ceteris paribus wages are higher in innovative unionised workplaces than they are 
in innovative non-unionized workplaces, a finding consistent with unions extracting a wage 
premium in return for managerial innovations (Bryson et al., 2005). Thus, even if workers do 
not like innovation they may be more sanguine about it if their wages rise as a consequence. 
For all these reasons it seems that unions may be able to assuage employees’ worst 
feelings about managerial innovations, potentially contributing to the higher productivity of 
innovations in unionized plants compared to non-unionized plants (Bryson et al., 2005). 
Similarly in the manufacturing sector in the United States unions are associated with a higher 
rate of innovation and with higher labour productivity in the presence of innovative practices 
(Black and Lynch, 2004). 
On the other hand, there are reasons why unionization may exacerbate negative 
effects of innovation on worker well-being. First, by increasing the flow of information 
between unions and management, unions can heighten employees’ awareness of problems 
and short-comings with management and their innovations, thus increasing employee 
dissatisfaction (Freeman and Medoff, 1984:142; Gallie et al., 1998:113–4). Second, unions 
increase the stock of dissatisfied workers because dissatisfied workers are less likely to quit 
in unionized workplaces than they are in nonunionized workplaces. This is so because the 
union offers a voice outlet for worker dissatisfaction that is less costly than quitting (Freeman 
and Medoff 1994:141). In doing so, unions raise average workplace tenure, which is 
associated with greater dissatisfaction (Bryson and McKay 1997). Third, where management 
                                                 
2 Black and Lynch (2004: footnote 5) make the point that, because worker-management agreements are rarely 
legally enforced unions can help overcome the incentive incompatibility problems discussed by Malcolmson 
(1983). 
3 Unions can lower the incentive to invest in new capital if they expropriate a portion of the rents arising from 
investment, thus lowering the returns to investment relative to non-union firms (Hirsch, 1992). Grout (1984) 
makes a similar point with respect to R&D investments. Lower profitability in union firms will also mean there 
is less internal capital available for reinvestment than in non-union firms. The counter-argument is that unions 
increase the cost of labour relative to capital thus leading to capital intensification. Empirical studies for the 
United States (Hirsch, 1990, 1992) and Britain (Denny and Nickell, 1991) suggest that unionised firms invest 
less in capital than non-union firms.  
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does not involve unions in the innovation process, worker discontent arising from unmet 
expectations and perceptions of procedural unfairness may result in lower well-being than in 
circumstances where the absence of a union is associated with lower worker expectations of 
involvement. 
It is difficult establishing the causal relationship between managerial innovation and 
employee well-being because innovations are not randomly assigned to workplaces and their 
employees. First, managerial innovation is not random, and may even be a response to 
worker well-being, in which case our results will be plagued by reverse causation. It is even 
conceivable that some management innovations are introduced to combat low morale and job 
dissatisfaction such that innovation is endogenous with respect to well-being. For instance, 
managers may wish to introduce changes in response to employee ill-being or dissatisfaction 
with current arrangements, in which case treating innovation as exogenous will overstate any 
negative effects of innovation on well-being. Alternatively, managers may wish to capitalise 
on times when employees are ‘feeling good’ by introducing innovations, thus potentially 
minimising opposition to change. If so, this could result in an understatement of any negative 
effects of innovation on well-being.  
Second, workers may select into or out of workplaces according to their preferences 
such that a non-random group of employees will be subject to managerial innovations. If this 
worker selection cannot be accounted for by observable characteristics entering our models, 
and if it is also correlated with individuals’ propensity for well-being or satisfaction, it will 
bias our estimates of innovation’s effect on well-being. For example, naturally optimistic and 
resilient workers may be more prepared to join workplaces which innovate. It is also 
plausible that employers intent on innovating seek to recruit and retain these sorts of workers. 
Either way, if unaccounted for this will induce an upward bias in our estimates of 
innovation’s effects on well-being. It is also plausible that those whose wellbeing is most 
adversely affected by workplace innovations will quit innovating workplaces leading us to 
understate the negative effects of innovation on wellbeing. 
Similarly, union coverage is not randomly assigned to workplaces or to workers. 
Indeed, there is a substantial literature which seeks to account for the endogeneity of 
unionisation in isolating the causal impact of unionization of job satisfaction.4  Union 
organizing is often assisted by a sense of grievance on the part of workers since it can trigger 
greater desire for union assistance and increases the net benefits of unionizing. This can help 
explain the negative effects of unionization on job satisfaction found in the literature (Bryson 
et al., 2005). Thus efforts to assess the mediating effect of unionisation on the links between 
innovation and worker well-being should account for the potential endogeneity of both 
innovation and unionisation. 
 
 
3. Data 
 
Our data are the linked employer-employee Workplace Employment Relations Survey 2004. 
The survey covers all sectors of the British economy with the exception of mining and 
quarrying; agriculture, hunting and forestry; fishing; private households with employed 
persons; and extraterritorial bodies. However, we confine our analyses to private sector 
workplaces. Workplaces with at least 5 employees were sampled from the Inter-Departmental 
Business Register with a view to conducting a face-to-face interview with the manager at the 
workplace responsible for employment relations. The response rate was 64%. The 
respondent’s permission was sought to distribute an eight page self-completion questionnaire 
                                                 
4 For a review of this literature see Bryson et al. (2005). 
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to a randomly selected set of employees at the workplace or, in the case of workplaces with 
fewer than 26 employees, all of them. This permission was granted in 86% of cases. A further 
10% of workplaces did not return any questionnaires. The overall response rate for the 
employee questionnaire was 61%.5 
 
3.1 Well-being measures 
Our data contain two sets of well-being measures. The first set is employee responses to the 
following question: “Thinking of the past few weeks how much of the time has your job 
made you feel each of the following.. tense, calm, relaxed, worried, uneasy, content?”  
Responses are coded on a 5-point scale: “all of the time”, “most of the time”, “some of the 
time”, “occasionally”, “never”. These measures have their origins in Warr’s (2007: 19-49) 
anxiety-contentment axis for measuring subjective well being (SWB). Warr distinguishes 
between the two ends of this axis along the two dimensions of pleasure and mental arousal. 
Anxiety, as measured by feeling tense, worried or uneasy, is associated with negative affect 
but entails a high level of arousal. Contentment, on the other hand, as measured by feeling 
calm, contented or relaxed, is associated with positive affect and entails low levels of 
arousal.6  Principal components factor analysis7 of the six SWB measures revealed two 
factors, one containing the measures of negative affect and the other containing the measures 
of positive affect. This confirms Wood’s (2007: 159) analysis which also used WERS 2004 
but for the whole economy. However, as explained by Wood (op. cit.), there are good reasons 
to treat the items as forming a one-dimensional scale. Thus, following Wood, we combine the 
six items into a single scale. Taken together these six anxiety-commitment items have a 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.85. Our single summative SWB score rescales the five-point scores for 
each measure into (-2, 2) scales where ‘-2’ is “never” and ‘2’ is “all of the time” having 
reverse-coded the negative affect items such that higher scores indicate higher positive affect. 
The scale thus runs from (-12, 12). Just over one-third (35%) of the sample score below zero; 
one-tenth (10%) score zero; and the remaining 55% have positive scores. 
Our second dependent variable is job satisfaction. Job satisfaction captures the 
pleasure-displeasure axis in Warr’s concept of subjective well-being. We use all eight facets 
of job satisfaction available in the data. Employees are asked: “How satisfied are you with the 
following aspects of your job?... achievement you get from your work; the scope for using 
your own initiative; the amount of influence you have over your job; the training you receive; 
the amount of pay you receive; your job security; the work itself; the amount of involvement 
you have in decision-making at this workplace?”  Responses are coded along a 5-point Likert 
scale ranging from “very satisfied” to “very dissatisfied”. Principal component analysis 
identifies a single factor with an eigenvalue above 1 (2.74) explaining 78% of the variance in 
the items. Factor loadings ranged from 0.26 (pay) to 0.80 (initiative). The Cronbach’s alpha 
for all eight job satisfaction items is 0.85.8 Our single summative job satisfaction score 
rescales the five-point scores for each measure into (-2, 2) scales where ‘-2’ is “very 
dissatisfied” and ‘2’ is “very satisfied”. The scale thus runs from (-16, 16). One fifth (20%) of 
                                                 
5 For more information about the survey see Kersley et al. (2006). 
6 Our data contain no information relating to Warr’s other key axis for measuring SWB, namely depression-
enthusiasm (depression being low affect and low arousal, while enthusiasm is high affect and high arousal). 
Since some of the predictors of depression-enthusiasm are known to differ from those for anxiety-contentment 
(Warr, 2007: 23) we cannot be sure how these other aspects of well-being may be associated with managerial 
innovations. 
7 We use orthogonal varimax principal components analysis with rotation. 
8 These results are similar to Wood’s (2008: 160) even though his analysis relates to the whole economy. 
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the sample score below zero; 30% score between 0 and 4; and the remaining 50% score 5 or 
more.9 
 
3.2 Innovation measures 
It is common in the literature to characterise workplace practices as ‘innovative’ or ‘new’ 
when, in fact, it is unclear whether they are indeed innovations or new. We overcome that 
problem in this paper by focusing our attention on changes in practices in the two years prior 
to the survey. Our innovation variables are based on managerial responses to the following 
question: 
“Over the past two years has management here introduced any of the changes listed 
on this card? PROBE: Which others? UNTIL 'None'.: 
 
1) Introduction of performance related pay 
2) Introduction or upgrading of computers 
3) Introduction or upgrading of other types of new technology 
4) Changes in working time arrangements 
5) Changes in the organisation of work 
6) Changes in work techniques or procedures 
7) Introduction of initiatives to involve employees 
8) Introduction of technologically new or significantly improved product or service 
9) NONE None of these” 
 
All eight innovations are positively correlated with correlations ranging between 0.19 
(introduction of incentive pay and the introduction of new technology) and 0.65 (changes in 
work techniques and procedures and changes in work organization). Principal components 
analysis revealed two factors with eigenvalues above one.10  The first factor (eigenvalue 
1.90), accounting for 59% of the variance in innovation, contains the four labour-oriented 
innovations, namely items 4, 5, 6 and 7 above.11  The Cronbach’s alpha for these items is 
0.65. The second factor (eigenvalue 1.59), accounting for 49% of the variance in innovation, 
contains the three capital-oriented innovations, that is, items 2, 3, and 8.12 The introduction of 
performance-related pay is positively correlated with both factors, but its factor loadings are 
not high (0.32 and 0.18 respectively) indicating that this particular managerial innovation 
does not belong to either factor. This is consistent with the literature in which incentive 
payments are often introduced as a means of supporting labour innovations such as the 
introduction of employee involvement practices (Huselid, 1995). We construct three count 
variables, one which sums all eight innovations (NCHANGE); a second for labour 
innovations based on items 4, 5, 6, and 7 with a maximum value of 4 (NLABCHG), and a 
third for capital innovations based on items 2, 3, and 8 with a maximum value of 3 
(NCAPCHG). One-quarter (25%) of workplaces had introduced no labour innovations in the 
previous two years; one-fifth had introduced one innovation (21%), another fifth (22%) had 
introduced two, a further fifth (19%) had introduced three, and 13% had introduced all four. 
One-fifth (20%) of workplaces had introduced none of the three capital innovations; one-
                                                 
9 The correlation between the SWB and job satisfaction scales is 0.45. If one regresses them against one another 
they account for 20% of the variance in the other. 
10 The factor analysis reported in this paragraph uses STATA’s factormat command which is intended for use 
with dummy variables. We report on the workplace-level data but results are virtually identical when run on 
employee-level data. 
11 The factor loadings range between 0.50 for employee involvement initiatives and 0.72 for changes in work 
techniques or procedures. 
12 The factor loadings range between 0.59 for the introduction of new or improved products or services and 0.73 
for the upgrading or introduction of new technology. 
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quarter (24%) had introduced one; 29% had introduced two; and one-quarter (26%) had 
introduced all three. Twelve percent of workplaces had introduced performance related pay in 
the previous two years. 
Where managers had innovated they were asked what type of involvement trade 
unions, joint committees and the employees affected had in “introducing and implementing 
this change”. The pre-coded responses were: “they decided; they negotiated; they were 
consulted; they were informed; no involvement”. Among employees who had experienced 
innovations in the last two years, 20% were in workplaces where there had been no employee 
involvement in the introduction of the innovation. Twelve per cent worked at workplaces 
where it had been subject to negotiation or was actually decided by employees; 56% were in 
workplaces where there had been consultation over innovation; and 38% were in workplaces 
where they had been informed about innovation. (The figures for negotiation, consultation 
and information sum to over 100% because in some cases workplaces took different 
approaches with respect to unions, joint committees and employees). 
 
3.3 Unionization variables 
We use individual-level indicators of union membership and bargaining coverage. The 
membership data are derived from the employee self-completion questionnaire. The coverage 
data are provided by the workplace manager for each single-digit occupation in the 
workplace. For each occupation present the manager is asked: “Which of the following 
statements most closely characterises the way that pay is set for [occupational group]?”  The 
first three pre-coded answers are: “collective bargaining for more than one employer eg. 
industry-wide agreement”; “collective bargaining at an organization level”; “collective 
bargaining at this workplace”.13  We link these data to the employee through her occupation 
which is collected in the self-completion questionnaire. Unlike the United States, although 
coverage and membership are positively correlated they are far from synonymous. Two-
thirds (66%) of employees were uncovered members; a further 12% were uncovered union 
members; 12% were covered members; and 10% were covered non-members. The correlation 
coefficient for membership and coverage was 0.40. 
 
3.4 Control variables 
In addition to union membership and coverage status, we control for age (9 dummies); 
academic qualifications (8 dummies); vocational qualifications (3 dummies); single-digit 
occupation (9 dummies); and dummies for disability, gender, ethnicity and having any 
dependent children. The dummy for male is interacted with the dependent child dummy. Our 
workplace-level controls are single-digit industry (11 dummies); region (10 dummies); log 
workplace employment size ; and dummies for low travel-to-work-area unemployment 
(below 1.2%) and location in an urban area. 
Two dummy variables are used as instrumental variables entering innovation models, 
namely whether the workplace produces several different products or services, and whether 
the workplace had benchmarked itself against other workplaces. Three dummy variables were 
used as instrumental variables entering unionization models, namely being a single-
establishment organization, aged at least 25 years, and facing overseas product market 
competition. 
 
                                                 
13 These data were edited and cleaned by the original research team. The variables can be identified in the 
deposited data file as the NFSOC* dummies. 
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4. Empirical Approach 
 
We analyse the effects of innovation on worker well-being using the additive scales for SWB 
and job satisfaction described in Section 3.1. We argue that the rescaling makes simple linear 
models appropriate. The relationship between the well-being of worker i employed in 
workplace f can be expresses by Equation 1: 
 
1) ififxiffiffif XxUnionsInnovationUnionsInnovationW εββββ ++++= '321  
 
where Wif expresses well-being (or job satisfaction) for individual i in workplace f, 
Innovationsf express the number of innovations introduced in workplace f (different 
measures), Unionif expresses a dummy for union coverage (which varies at the worker level), 
while the X’s express our control vector and εif represents a standard normal distributed error 
term. β1 gives the effect of innovation on the well being of non-unionized workers, whereas 
(β1 + β3) gives the effect of innovation on the well being of unionized workers. 
The models are unweighted and so provide within-sample estimates, rather than 
population estimates. Individuals’ probability of sample selection is not independent of one 
another since they are clustered within sampled workplaces. Standard errors are adjusted to 
account for this using clustering14 and we use the robust estimator to tackle remaining 
heteroskedasticity in the error terms. Sample sizes vary a little across the well-being and job 
satisfaction models. For well-being the unweighted number of employee observations is 
13,153 and they are clustered in 1,228 private sector workplaces (an average of nearly 11 
employees per workplace).15 For job satisfaction the unweighted number of employee 
observations is 12,689 and they are clustered in 1,228 workplaces. We also run Equation 1 
(without the interaction term) for unionized and non-unionized employees separately. 
Whilst these models provide a good approximation for the independent correlation 
between well-being and innovation, they make no attempt to account for the potential 
endogeneity of innovation or unionization with respect to worker well-being. As discussed 
above, this can arise for a number of reasons. First, managerial innovation is not random, and 
may even be a response to worker well-being, in which case our results will be plagued by 
reverse causation. Second, workers may select into or out of workplaces according to their 
preferences such that a non-random group of employees will be subject to managerial 
innovations. Similarly, unionization is not ascribed to workplaces and workers randomly. 
Indeed, union organizing is often assisted by a sense of grievance on the part of workers since 
it can trigger greater desire for union assistance and increases the net benefits of unionizing. 
This can help explain the negative effects of unionization on job satisfaction found in the 
literature (Bryson et al., 2005). 
To account for the endogeneity of innovation, we run two-stage least squares 
regressions, using STATA’s –ivreg2- command. In the first stage we estimate innovation 
with an OLS model incorporating a set of instruments which affect firms’ propensity to 
innovate but can be reasonably excluded from the second stage equation which estimates 
well-being (or job satisfaction). The first instrument is benchmarking: those that benchmark 
are more likely to innovate since they seek to emulate the best practice among their peers.16  
However, there is no reason to suspect that benchmarking will have any effect on worker 
                                                 
14 Thus we take into account the so-called Moulton-critique (Moulton, 1990). 
15 We lose over 1,500 observations by excluding workers with missing data on items used in the analysis. This is 
another reason why we decide to estimate within-sample rather than population estimates. 
16 The survey question is: “I'd now like to ask you about benchmarking By this I mean examining the way things 
are done at other workplaces and comparing them with this establishment. Over the past two years, has this 
establishment benchmarked itself against any other workplaces?”  
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well-being. The second instrument is product and service diversity at the establishment: this 
is likely to increase the propensity to innovate because both the opportunity and, perhaps, the 
necessity to innovate are greater where one has more products/services going to market. But, 
there is no reason to suspect a relationship between product diversity and well-being.  
Initially we run these models for the whole private sector and for the union and non-
union subsamples, treating union status as if it is exogenous. However, we then seek to 
account for the endogeneity of union status by first running STATA’s –movestay- command 
to estimate an endogenous switching regression model.17 The model generates Mills’ ratios 
for the two regimes, namely union and non-union. We then incorporate the inverse of these 
Mills’ ratios into the –ivreg2- procedure thus accounting for the endogeneity of both union 
status and innovation. 
We use three dummy variables in the switching regression to help identify the model. 
The first is being a single-site firm: the marginal costs of a union organizing in a single-site 
firm are greater than for a multi-site firm, thus reducing the likelihood of collective 
bargaining coverage. Second, we use a dummy identifying whether the workplace faces 
overseas product market competition. Overseas competition can increase worker demand for 
unionization where unions help workers maintain wages relative to non-union workers in the 
face of more intensive competition (Bratsberg and Ragan, 2002). It may also signal high 
barriers to entry which can only be met by global firms which, typically, indicate rents which 
unions seek to share. Our third variable is a dummy identifying workplaces aged at least 
twenty-five years old: unions found it easier to organize workplaces prior to the 1980s and 
this differential has persisted due to the costs employers face in derecognising unions 
(Millward et al., 2000). We maintain that it is reasonable to exclude these three variables 
from the employee well-being equation. We run a range of diagnostic tests designed to see 
how credible these identification assumptions are. The instruments perform well. The results 
from the diagnostic test are reported in detail in Section 5. 
 
 
5. Results 
 
Table 1 presents OLS estimates of the association between innovation and employee well-
being as measured by the additive well-being scale. Panel A presents results using the 
additive innovation scale. Panels B and C present identical models but replace the global 
innovation count measure with the additive scales for labour and capital innovations 
respectively. In each case four models are presented. Model (1) is run for the whole private 
sector and incorporates the employee’s coverage status. Model (2) includes the interaction 
term between innovation and coverage. Models (3) and (4) are for uncovered and covered 
employees respectively. The pattern of results is identical in Panels A and B. Innovation is 
associated with lower employee well-being but, when the model is split by union coverage 
status, the association is only statistically significant in the case of uncovered employees. 
Even though the pattern seems clear, the differences between covered and the non-covered 
workers are significant at only at the 10 percent significance level. Panel C indicates that 
capital innovations are only significantly associated with lower employee well-being among 
uncovered employees, and only at the 10 percent significance level. 
We tested the sensitivity of these results to model specification. First, we added the 
dummy variable for the introduction of performance-related pay in the previous two years. 
                                                 
17 -movestay- implements the full information maximum likelihood method (FIML) to simultaneously estimate 
binary and continuous parts of the model in order to yield consistent standard errors. This approach relies on 
joint normality of the error terms in the binary and continuous equations (Lokshin and Sajaia, 2004). . 
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This was not statistically significant and it did not affect the results. Second, we replaced the 
coverage variable with a variable which captured covered membership. Being a covered 
member was associated with lower well-being than simply being covered. However, this did 
not affect the association between innovations and wellbeing. 
Table 2 provides results for job satisfaction, using the same specifications. The 
negative association between innovation and job satisfaction is only significant in the case of 
uncovered employees and is only apparent for labour innovations (NLABCHG). The 
differences between effects on covered and uncovered employees are not statistically 
significant. 
If the way in which innovation is introduced affects worker well-being one might 
expect this to show up in models replacing the innovation count with the nature of managerial 
engagement over the introduction of innovation. We tested this proposition by introducing a 
variable capturing the number of innovations over which employers had involved employees, 
either by consulting them, negotiating with them or allowing them to make the decision. In an 
alternative specification we counted the number of innovations over which there had been no 
employee involvement. These variables were not statistically significant; nor did they affect 
the results reported above. 
Table 3 presents estimates of innovation effects on employee well-being derived from 
an instrumental variables approach which accounts for the potential endogeneity of 
innovation. Endogenising innovation, using benchmarking and product diversity as 
instruments, results in an increase in the innovation coefficients. This is apparent for all three 
innovation count measures. The innovation effect on wellbeing is underestimated when it is 
treated as exogenous, suggesting innovations are introduced at times when employees have 
positive underlying feelings about their work, or that employers who innovate recruit 
employees who are generally positive and well-disposed towards their work. The table 
confirms that this innovation effect is confined to uncovered employees. Furthermore the 
differences in the estimated coefficients for innovation between the covered and non-covered 
workers are all statistically significant. 
In Table 4 we use the same approach to endogenise innovation in the job satisfaction 
equations. Compared with the OLS estimates in Table 2 the negative innovation coefficients 
are larger and, in all three cases, the innovation counts are statistically significant for 
uncovered employees only. However, in contrast to the results for well-being in Table 3, the 
differences between covered and non-covered employees are not statistically significant. The 
difference in the point estimates between covered and uncovered employees is very similar to 
that reported for well-being in Table 3 but the estimates are less precisely estimated. 
We run a range of diagnostic tests designed to assess the credibility of our 
identification assumptions. Some of these are reported in Tables 3 and 4. First, we find that 
the instruments are separately and jointly statistically significant in the innovation equations. 
Second, using a Hansen J statistic we find that our estimates pass the over-identification test, 
that is to say, the instruments can reasonably be excluded from the second stage well-being 
and satisfaction models. Third, we use the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic to see whether 
our estimates suffer from weak instruments.18 The instruments perform very satisfactorily 
(the F-statistic is between 5 and 31). Finally using STATA’s –endog- option we confirm the 
endogeneity of innovation as a regressor in both the whole private sector and uncovered 
employee equations. 
Next we ran endogenous switching regression models to account for the fact that 
some unobservable employee characteristics that influence the probability of choosing union 
coverage could also influence the employee’s well-being in their job. The three variables 
                                                 
18 This test is similar to the Cragg-Donald but, unlike Cragg-Donald, it accounts for heteroskedasticity. 
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used to identify the model were individually and jointly statistically significant in the 
coverage equation. The correlation coefficients for the unobservables in the coverage and 
well-being equations are not statistically significant. However, the correlation coefficient for 
the unobservables in the coverage and job satisfaction equation are positive for both covered 
and uncovered employees, but only significantly different from zero for the correlation 
between the sector choice equation and the uncovered employee job satisfaction equation.19 
This indicates that employees who choose to work in the uncovered sector have lower job 
satisfaction in that sector than a randomly assigned employee by virtue of their unobservable 
characteristics, while those working in the covered sector do no better or worse than a 
random individual. 
We take the inverse of the corresponding Mill’s ratios for the two regimes and plug 
these into the –ivreg2- estimates in order to account for selection into union status while, at 
the same time, accounting for the endogeneity of innovation. The results are presented in 
Table 5. For individual well being, the lambda terms are never statistically significant. 
Compared with Table 3, the innovation coefficients for uncovered employees fall a little but 
the pattern of results is much the same: the negative impact of innovation on wellbeing is 
confined to uncovered employees. For job satisfaction, the lambda term for selection into the 
covered sector is significant for uncovered employees suggesting systematic selection of 
workers into the covered group. The pattern with respect to the innovation coefficient is still 
very similar to the one we find without accounting for selection into coverage, although the 
size of the coefficients drops a little. 
If workers sort into or out of innovating workplaces according to their preferences it is 
possible this might affect our results. We therefore ran our estimates for short-tenure and 
longer tenured employees distinguishing between those who had been at the workplace for 
under two years – that is, those who had arrived in the period over which we measure 
innovations – and the remainder. The results remained unchanged: the effects of innovation 
on wellbeing and job satisfaction were confined to uncovered employees, irrespective of their 
workplace tenure. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Using private sector linked employer-employee data for Britain we explore the effects of 
management innovations on job satisfaction and an alternative measure of subjective well-
being capturing employees’ feelings of work-induced contentment versus stress and anxiety. 
We distinguish between effects among employees who are covered by collective bargaining 
and those who are not. 
We find management innovations are associated with lower employee subjective 
well-being. This is the case for three different count measures of innovation – a global 
measure of innovation and measures for labour innovations and capital innovations. 
However, the effects are confined to uncovered employees. The effects become more 
pronounced when we account for the endogeneity of innovation, perhaps indicating that 
innovative employers select workers who are better able to cope with change, or that 
employers tend to innovate when worker well-being is high, thus making them more resilient 
to change. It is also possible that workers with higher well-being self select into innovative 
                                                 
19 The correlation coefficient for the unobservables in the coverage equation and the job satisfaction equation for 
uncovered employees was 0.849 (t=53.06). The Wald test for the joint independence of the three equations has a 
p-value of 0.0000. 
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workplaces, although there is no indication of this when we split the analyses by workplace 
tenure. 
The OLS estimates are weaker in the case of job satisfaction: only labour innovations 
are associated with lower employee job satisfaction. Again, the effect is confined to 
uncovered employees. When we endogenise innovation the effects of innovation become 
much stronger such that all three innovation measures are negatively and significantly related 
to the job satisfaction of uncovered employees. The difference in the estimated effect of 
innovation between covered and uncovered employees, however, is not statistically 
significant in the case of job satisfaction. 
Workers often look to trade unions to negotiate with management over change at the 
workplace to ensure that any changes that do take place take account of employee interests. 
We find little direct evidence that negotiation, consultation or information provision in 
relation to innovation is associated with an amelioration of the negative effect of innovation 
on employee well-being. However, we do find that the negative effect of innovation on 
subjective well being is absent when workers are covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement. We cannot say, based on these results, what the exact mechanism is, but it seems 
quite clear that one of the things unions do is to make workplace innovations less costly to 
workers. 
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Table 1: OLS for correlation between innovation and well-being 
 
 Model (1) 
All Workers 
Model (2) 
All workers 
with 
interaction 
Model (3) 
Uncovered 
Model (4) 
Covered 
Difference 
between 
covered and 
uncovered 
 Panel A: Innovation = NCHANGE  
nchange -0.074 -0.103 -0.098 0.003 -0.101 
 (3.02)** (3.70)** (3.54)** (0.06) (1.77) 
covered -0.136 -0.622    
 (1.04) (2.40)*    
Nchange*covered  0.120    
  (2.18)*    
Constant 3.800 3.892 4.098 2.455  
 (10.39)** (10.63)** (10.24)** (2.70)**  
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07  
 Panel B: Innovation = NLABCHG  
nlabchg -0.136 -0.175 -0.171 -0.016 -0.155 
 (3.63)** (4.15)** (4.06)** (0.20) (1.71) 
covered -0.130 -0.491    
 (0.99) (2.22)*    
Nlabchg*covered  0.174    
  (2.06)*    
Constant 3.768 3.824 4.042 2.485  
 (10.38)** (10.53)** (10.18)** (2.76)**  
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07  
 Panel C: Innovation = NCAPCHG  
ncapchg -0.066 -0.109 -0.098 0.037 -0.135 
 (1.31) (1.94) (1.75) (0.34) (1.10) 
covered -0.134 -0.466    
 (1.02) (1.85)    
Ncapchg*covered  0.179    
  (1.54)    
Constant 3.744 3.818 4.049 2.430  
 (10.22)** (10.44)** (10.10)** (2.68)**  
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08  
 
Notes: 
(1) Unweighted OLS of EWELLSC well-being scale. Robust estimator with clustered 
standard errors. T-stats in parentheses. *=significant at 95% confidence interval; 
**=significant at 99% confidence interval. 
(2) Models (1) and (2): whole economy, N=13,153. Model (3): uncovered employees. 
N=10,261. Model (4): covered employees. N=2,892. 
(3) All models contain the following individual-level controls:  age (9 dummies); academic 
qualifications (8 dummies); vocational qualifications (3 dummies); single-digit occupation (9 
dummies); and dummies for disability, gender, ethnicity and having any dependent children. 
The dummy for male is interacted with the dependent child dummy. It also contains the 
following workplace-level controls: single-digit industry (11 dummies); region (10 
dummies); log workplace employment size; and dummies for low travel-to-work-area 
unemployment (below 1.2%) and location in an urban area 
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Table 2: OLS for correlation between innovation and job satisfaction 
 
 Model (1) 
All Workers 
Model (2) 
All 
workers 
with 
interaction 
Model (3) 
Uncovered 
Model (4) 
Covered 
Difference 
between 
covered and 
uncovered 
 Panel A: Innovation = NCHANGE  
nchange -0.019 -0.044 -0.031 0.041 -0.072 
 (0.57) (1.21) (0.85) (0.58) (0.91) 
covered -0.480 -0.904    
 (2.83)** (2.54)*    
Nchange*covered  0.104    
  (1.38)    
Constant 5.001 5.091 5.408 2.596  
 (10.09)** (10.26)** (9.94)** (2.07)*  
R-squared 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.08  
 Panel B: Innovation = NLABCHG  
nlabchg -0.088 -0.130 -0.115 0.031 -0.146 
 (1.75) (2.38)* (2.07)* (0.28) (1.18) 
covered -0.479 -0.875    
 (2.82)* (2.89)**    
Nlabchg*covered  0.190    
  (1.59)    
Constant 5.032 5.093 5.414 2.653  
 (10.20)** (10.36)** (10.03)** (2.12)*  
R-squared 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.08  
 Panel C: Innovation = NCAPCHG  
ncapchg 0.057 0.026 0.047 0.124 -0.077 
 (0.84) (0.35) (0.63) (0.89) (0.49) 
covered -0.474 -0.713    
 (2.80)** (2.14)*    
Ncapchg*covered  0.128    
  (0.86)    
Constant 4.937 4.992 5.331 2.594  
 (9.95)** (10.04)** (9.78)** (2.09)*  
R-squared 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.08  
 
Notes: 
(1) Unweighted OLS of SATSC8 job satisfaction scale. Robust estimator with clustered 
standard errors. T-stats in parentheses. *=significant at 95% confidence interval; 
**=significant at 99% confidence interval. 
(2) Model (1): whole economy, N=12,689. Model (2): uncovered employees. N=9,881. 
Model (3): covered employees. N=2,808. 
(3) See footnote to Table 1 for controls. 
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Table 3: Effects of innovation on well-being instrumenting for innovation 
 
 Model (1) 
All workers 
Model (2) 
Uncovered workers 
Model (3) 
Covered workers 
Difference between 
covered and 
uncovered 
Panel A: Innovation = NCHANGE  
Nchange -0.258 -0.364 0.010 -0.374 
 (2.49)* (2.89)** (0.54) (2.94)** 
Covered -0.151    
 (1.12)    
Hansen J p-val 0.91 0.71 0.84  
-endog- p-val 0.06 0.02 0.57  
KP Wald rk Wald F 31.27 26.00 10.41  
Panel B: Innovation = NLABCHG  
Nlabchg -0.418 -0.588 0.173 -0.761 
 (2.50)* (2.92)** (0.55) (2.04)* 
Covered -0.131    
 (0.97)    
Hansen J p-val 0.93 0.90 0.84  
-endog- p-val 0.08 0.03 0.52  
KP Wald rk Wald F 28.62 22.96 9.47  
Panel C: Innovation = NCAPCHG  
Ncapchg -0.797 -1.116 0.270 -1.386 
 (2.28)* (2.48)* (0.53) (2.04)* 
Covered -0.180    
 (1.23)    
Hansen J p-val 0.65 0.40 0.83  
-endog- p-val 0.02 0.01 0.62  
KP Wald rk Wald F 12.12 10.07 9.31  
 
Notes: 
(1) Unweighted –ivreg2- of EWELLSC well-being scale. Robust estimator with clustered 
standard errors. T-stats in parentheses. *=significant at 95% confidence interval; 
**=significant at 99% confidence interval. 
(2) Sample sizes and controls are as per Table 1. 
(3) Innovation is instrumented with benchmarking and diversity in products/services. 
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Table 4: Effects of innovation on job satisfaction instrumenting for innovation 
 
 Model (1) 
All workers 
Model (2) 
Uncovered workers 
Model (3) 
Covered workers 
Difference between 
covered and 
uncovered 
Panel A: Innovation = NCHANGE  
Nchange -0.328 -0.441 0.051 -0.492 
 (2.23)* (2.59)** (0.20) (1.60) 
Covered -0.508    
 (2.88)**    
Hansen J p-val 0.67 0.47 0.90  
-endog- p-val 0.02 0.01 0.96  
KP Wald rk Wald F 31.03 26.31 10.34  
Panel B: Innovation = NLABCHG  
nlabchg -0.535 -0.723 0.086 -0.809 
 (2.28)* (2.66)** (0.20) (1.59) 
covered -0.480    
 (2.73)***    
Hansen J p-val 0.80 0.62 0.90  
-endog- p-val 0.04 0.01 0.89  
KP Wald rk Wald F 28.21 22.74 9.71  
Panel C: Innovation = NCAPCHG  
ncapchg -0.989 -1.309 0.141 -1.450 
 (2.01)* (2.22)* (0.20) (1.58) 
covered 0.551    
 (2.90)**    
Hansen J p-val 0.48 0.28 0.90  
-endog- p-val 0.01 0.01 0.97  
KP Wald rk Wald F 23.52 20.68 4.87  
 
Notes: 
(1) Unweighted –ivreg2- of EWELLSC well-being scale. Robust estimator with clustered 
standard errors. T-stats in parentheses. z=significant at 10% level, *=significant at 95% 
confidence interval; **=significant at 99% confidence interval. 
(2) Controls and sample sizes are as per Table 2. Innovation is instrumented with 
benchmarking and diversity in products/services. 
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Table 5: Effects of innovation on well-being and job satisfaction instrumenting for 
innovation and coverage 
 
 Well being Job satisfaction 
 Uncovered 
employees 
Covered employees Uncovered 
employees 
Covered employees 
Panel A:Innovation = NCHANGE   
nchange -0.347 (2.72)** 0.117 (0.64) -0.362 (2.14)* 0.098 (0.38) 
Lambdau -0.589 (0.60) 0.092 (0.07) -3.026 (2.00)* 1.201 (0.49) 
Lambdanu -0.143 (1.72) 0.103 (0.58) 0.060 (0.40) 0.467 (1.41) 
Hansen J p-val 0.73 0.84 0.48 0.89 
-endog- p-val 0.03 0.49 0.02 0.80 
KP Wald rk Wald F 24.82 10.20 24.98 10.18 
Panel B: Innovation = NLABCHG   
nlabchg -0.560 (2.97)** 0.205 (0.64) -0.595 (2.21)* 0.167 (0.38) 
Lambdau 0.053 (0.07) 0.104 (0.08) -2.677 (1.77) 1.240 (0.51) 
Lambdanu 0.069 (0.97) 0.112 (0.63) 0.098 (0.67) 0.481 (1.48) 
Hansen J p-val 0.92 0.85 0.62 0.89 
-endog- p-val 0.04 0.46 0.04 0.74 
KP Wald rk Wald F 21.59 9.13 21.21 9.37 
Panel C: Innovation = NCAPCHG   
ncapchg -1.068 (2.33)* 0.316 (0.63) -1.061 (1.84) 0.268 (0.39) 
Lambdau -0.532 (0.61) 0.012 (0.01) -3.595 (2.20)* 1.063 (0.42) 
Lambdanu -0.009 (0.10) 0.086 (0.47) -0.020 (0.11) 0.437 (1.23) 
Hansen J p-val 0.40 0.84 0.29 0.89 
-endog- p-val 0.01 0.36 0.02 0.80 
KP Wald rk Wald F 9.46 5.19 9.75 5.03 
 
Notes: 
(1) Unweighted –ivreg2- of EWELLSC well-being scale and STASC8 job satisfaction scale. 
Separate models for covered and uncovered employees incorporating lambda selection terms 
for covered (LAMBDAU) and uncovered (LAMBDANU) sectors obtained from the 
endogenous switching regression models. Innovation is instrumented with benchmarking and 
diversity in products/services. Coverage is instrumented with age of establishment, single 
establishment and facing overseas market competition. 
(2) Robust estimator with clustered standard errors. z-stats in parentheses. *=significant at 
95% confidence interval; **=significant at 99% confidence interval. 
(3) Sample sizes and controls are as per previous tables. 
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